From Russian Oil to U.S. Supply Chains: The Hidden Risk of Secondary Tariffs

A barrel of Russian crude purchased in Asia might seem far removed from an American manufacturer waiting for critical machinery components, or a hospital awaiting life-saving pharmaceuticals, or a retailer building its inventory of the hottest holiday gift items this year. But the distance is shorter than it appears.

On Sept. 18, President Donald Trump signed into law the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The law gives the U.S. authority to impose tariffs of up to 100%, on top of other applicable duties, on goods from countries that rank among the largest purchasers of Russian oil or natural gas, or are identified as major facilitators of sanctions evasion. The objective is to make continued purchases of Russian energy more costly. But if the tariffs are applied to large economies such as China or India, the effects would not be isolated to the global energy markets.

Most companies will ask, "What would a 100% tariff cost us?" A better question is, "What happens if tariffs rise while energy prices increase, shipping becomes more expensive, and thousands of companies simultaneously search for alternative suppliers?" Because oil, transportation and manufacturing are interconnected, secondary tariffs could produce a far more complicated response than an ordinary tariff.

China and India aren’t simply purchasers of Russian oil. In 2025, the U.S. imported approximately $308.7 billion in goods from China and $103.8 billion from India. That’s more than $400 billion in annual imports exposed, directly or indirectly, to changing trade conditions.

This story was originally published by SupplyChainBrain. Read the full story at SupplyChainBrain →